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Gulf of Mexico Region

Losses of Well Control - 1996

January 24, 1996 - Oryx Energy Company

Remarks: Oryx was in the process of completing Well A-17. The target sand was perforated. The perforating guns were pulled from the well and a packer plug retrieving tool was made up to the bottom of the workstring/tubing. The packer plug was then pulled. A gravel pack assembly and gravel pack screen were then run in the well. Completion fluid started to flow out the top of the workstring/tubing as it was being worked in the well. The crew was not able to connect the top drive unit to the workstring/tubing. The blind rams were closed, but the flow out the workstring/tubing did not change. Additional rams and the annular preventer were closed. Gas flowing out the workstring/tubing ignited. Forty-five personnel were evacuated from the rig by two vessels without incident. Within two hours after the fire ignited, the top drive fell to the rig floor. Shortly afterwards, the derrick toppled. The fire extinguished itself about midnight on 1/28/96, and the well was killed on 2/7/96. See Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Report MMS 98-0012 for more details.

November 10, 1996 - Norcen Explorer, Inc.

Remarks: At approximately 1100 hours on 11/09/96 a drilling break occurred. The rig crew observed a loss of 200 psi drill fluid pump pressure and a gain of five strokes per minute from the original pump rate. The crew initiated well control operations at 0400 hours on 11/10/96 to circulate out 12.2 ppg gas cut drill fluid with 13.2 ppg drill fluid at a 40 strokes per minute pump rate with 850 psi drill pipe pressure. At 1600 hours the drill pipe started rising, with the choke plugging. The mud weight in the pits was 12.6 ppg, and the returns were salt water, drill fluid, and gas. The well was shut in with 600 psi on the drill pipe and 975 psi on the casing. Drill fluid weight was increased to 13.2 ppg and kill operations were initiated by using the driller's method. At 1630 hours drill fluid began flowing between the 30-inch surface casing and 16-inch conductor casing. All personnel evacuated the rig to a nearby facility. All personnel were accounted for, and there were no injuries. Uncontrolled flow was observed through the night from a vessel at a safe distance. At 0630 hours on 11/11/96 water, drill fluid, and gas flow from the well continued. No pollution was observed. At 0730 hours on 11/11/96 flow from the well ended due to an apparent formation bridge. A crew reboarded the rig to plug and abandon the well. The well was plugged and abandoned on 11/21/96.

November 27, 1996 - Tana Oil and Gas Corporation

Remarks: Prior to going into Well # 4 with a wireline gauging tool, it was necessary to pressure up to 2600 psi using the mud pump to open the SSSV. After the SSSV was open, the pressure was bled down into the mud pit room and an explosion occurred. The SSSV was not closed thereby allowing the continuous feeding of the fire. The platform was evacuated and 11 personnel were treated for injuries with 3 requiring hospitalization. A fire boat extinguished the fire on 11/28/96. A crew boarded the rig and closed the SSSV. There was approximately $8,000,000 damage to the rig. The well was later completed and put on production.

December 03, 1996 - Amoco Production Company

Remarks: Prior to drilling the surface hole section of the Well C-1, a 60 x 48 inch drive pipe had been installed, and a 20 inch conductor was set without significant problems. However, the surface hole section from 900 feet to 6000 feet TVD had continuous seepage problems throughout the drilling phase (25 to 30 bbls per hour) with severe losses reported on several occasions. After making a wiper trip in preparation for running casing, a fluid loss of 215 bbls was observed over a 17 hour period while circulating and waiting on weather. A total of 401 bbls of drilling mud were lost while running the 13 5/8 inch surface casing and 142 bbls were lost while circulating prior to cementing. Volumes could not be determined due to overboard dumping of the surface volume while cementing. A grout string was run in 20 x 13 5/8 inch annulus with no cement observed on bottoms-up. A cement plug was spotted in the annulus using 84 sacks of cement. The grout string was then pulled up the hole to circulate. The annulus was circulated to bottoms-up, with no cement observed. Fifty barrels of sugar water were spotted and the grout string was removed from the annulus. Immediately upon removal of the grout string a window was cut in the 20 inch to facilitate installation of the 13 5/8 inch wellhead. Fluid was observed in the annulus. After waiting on cement for approximately 12 hours the 20 inch and 13 5/8 inch casings were cut for wellhead installation (no fluid was observed in the annulus at that time). The slip-lock wellhead was then installed with a base plate installed between the wellhead and the drive pipe. While nippling-up a 3 foot riser, an odor was noted by the personnel installing the riser. Fluid then started burping beneath the base plate. The rig was evacuated via survival craft after rigging up spray hoses directed at the wellhead. Dry gas began to flow from beneath the base plate. The well initially flowed gas, then saltwater with entrained gas. Flow continued until 12/06/96.

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Last Updated: 06/24/08, 03:07 PM