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Gulf of Mexico Region

Losses of Well Control - 2002

January 12, 2002 – BP Amoco Corporation

Remarks: The crew was rigging up a snubbing unit on a dual completion wellhead in preparation to plug and abandon the well when the surface casing failed to support the weight of the BOP stack and collapsed. This resulted in the wellhead shifting downward 10 to 16 inches causing the dual crossover offset spool to crack at the weld. One of the completions was blinded off prior to nippling up the BOP stack, but the other was open. As a result of the crack in the spool, there was a release of less than one gallon of fluid lasting approximately 30 seconds. The crew secured the well by closing the secondary lower master valve. Investigation showed that the surface casing failed due to corrosion.

August 8, 2002 – BP Exploration & Oil Inc.

(also listed as fire)

Remarks: This well was originally intended to bottom on an adjacent lease. After the loss of control, the well was P&A’d on lease G02628. On August 8, 2002, the rig was conducting directional drilling operations from the well’s surface location on Platform C. The well had reached 3,590 measured depth. Conductor casing had been set at 1,201 feet, and cemented to surface. The well had been kicked off at 2,421 feet, and the angle had been built to approximately 27 degrees. At 0800 hours, a short trip was initiated with the intent of pulling up into the casing, and opening the hole prior to drilling ahead. The crew circulated bottoms-up, and had pulled and racked six stands of pipe. At approximately 0825 hours, the seventh stand was being pulled when the well began flowing. By 0830 hours, the annular diverter element was closed, and the well was put into the diverter system. The alarm was sounded to evacuate the rig and platform. At approximately 0900, the end of the port diverter pipe blew off. The evacuation of the rig was completed shortly thereafter. At approximately 0905 hours, the uncontrolled flow of gas, water, sand, and hydrocarbons caught fire. The fire from the uncontrolled flow out of the diverter then caught combustibles on the rig floor on fire. At 0915, the well apparently bridged over and the uncontrolled flow diminished, and ceased. The fire began to abate, being reduced to the combustibles on the rig floor. By mid-afternoon, the fire was out, and at 1630 hours, crew members reboarded the rig. After an inspection, operations to secure the well commenced. These operations continued until August 27, 2002, when the well was fully plugged and abandoned. The rig was removed from the platform, and jacked up away from the platform in order to repair the damage caused by the fire. Damage was estimated at about $2 million. For more information see Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Report MMS 2003-023.

September 7, 2002 – El Paso Production Oil & Gas Company

Remarks: While drilling ahead on September 7, 2002, the crew increased the mud weight in several increments, due to excessive gas unit readings. While making a connection, the crew observed that the well was flowing. They shut the well in. On September 8, 2002, while they were circulating the mud, the hole started losing returns. The crew spotted three lost return pills, and reciprocated the drill pipe. While they were attempting to strip off bottom, the shut-in casing pressure dropped, and they noticed gas bubbles at the surface. An ROV was sent to the sea floor, and it showed the bubbles coming from the sea floor about 80 feet from the well. On September 9, 2002, the drill pipe was stripped up the hole, and 18ppg mud was pumped into the hole. Next, they pumped lost circulation material into the hole, followed by 14.2ppg mud. The bubbles at the sea floor stopped, and the well was dead. Gas cut mud was circulated out of the hole, and the crew set a cement plug. The crew set a storm packer due to an impending hurricane. When they returned, they set a cement retainer above the last casing shoe, and squeezed the shoe. They drilled out the cement shoe, and began a sidetracked well.

October 3, 2002 – Murphy Exploration & Production Co.
 

Remarks: The uncontrolled flow from Well No. 14 was caused by hurricane damage that decapitated the well and bent the wellhead at 15 degrees. The loss of the wellhead caused differential flow across the J Storm Choke. The storm choke failed to contain the pressure over time and was at some point released from its settings and ejected from the wellhead. While the mechanism that caused the choke to fail is not known, the most likely explanation is that the slips of the choke were cut by grit carried by seepage around the choke body, ultimately releasing the choke and allowing the well to flow uncontrolled. An estimated 350 barrels of crude oil was released, creating a dark brown slick 6 miles long by 50 yards wide. A Fast Response Unit (FSU) was dispatched which recovered approximately 145 barrels of the crude oil spilled. The estimated volume of crude oil lost without recovery is 205 barrels.

NRC Report: 624859

November 14, 2002 – BP Exploration & Production Inc.

Remarks: The rig was conducting directional drilling operations from the well’s surface location on Platform “C”. Sixteen-inch conductor casing had been set at approximately 1,200 feet, and cemented to the surface. The well had been kicked off at approximately 1,200 feet, and the angle had been built to approximately 60 degrees. The well had reached approximately 5,150 feet (measured depth). At 2300 hours, on November 13, 2002, surface casing was run to approximately 5,140 feet, and cemented to the surface with returns. At approximately 0230 hours on November 14, 2002, the surface/conductor casing annulus started to flow gas and some fluid. The diverter sealing packer element and diverter ventline valves were shut by placing the diverter system into “test”. This action allowed holding back pressure to attempt to let the cement cure. Pressure on the annulus then built to 580 psi. Intermittent leaking of gas past the diverter flowline seals was observed and heard to be increasing as the pressure mounted. Because of uncertainty of the cause of the leak, confusion about the integrity of the diverter flowline seals, and the fact that the event occurred at night, the rig floor was evacuated. Attempts to open the diverter ventline valves to relieve the rising pressure, or to contain the diverter flowline seal leak by increasing the closing pressure of the seals, failed when the remote controls could not override the “test” mode. At 0515 hours, with gas detected on the rig, and pressure rising on the annulus, and presumably the conductor casing shoe, evacuation of all personnel on the rig and platform was completed. By November 16, 2002, personnel had re-boarded the rig, contained the leaking seal elements, and initiated kill operations. Isolation of the source of the annular flow of gas was subsequently achieved, and normal drilling operations were resumed by November 22, 2002. For more information see Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Report MMS 2003-068.

December 6, 2002 – Kerr McGee Corporation

Remarks: A Kerr-McGee Platform Operator was flying from Ship Shoal Block 214, Platform K to Ship Shoal Block 239, Platform A, when he spotted a watery spray blowing up from the platform at approximately 0700 hours. He told the pilot not to attempt a landing. They flew to Ship Shoal Block 233, Platform B where he called the production Team Leader and informed him of what he saw. He then took a boat to Ship Shoal Block 239, Platform A. Upon arriving on the boat landing, he activated the ESD station. The SCSSV in Well A-12 closed as a result of the manual ESD activation. The operator then proceeded to the well and closed the manual master valve. He verified that the SCSSV needle valve was full open (and it was). The well produced approximately 12 hours open to the atmosphere. Approximately 21 gallons of condensate were released during the incident which produced a barely visible sheen on the water.

The ESD control system was later tested. It was found that the needle valve for the flowline sensing line was stopped up with sand and a small piece of metal. It was also found that the final relay in the TSE logic in the panel was stuck. This malfunctioning relay is what caused the TSE loop to not close the SCSSV. The ESD holding signal flows through this same valve, therefore manually activating the ESD station did result in the loss of this signal, and the SCSSV closed.

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Last Updated: 06/24/08, 03:07 PM