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  Pacific Region

Injuries – 2003 (1 incident – 1 injury total)

11-Apr-2003 – Exxon Mobil Corporation

MMS Investigation Report:

 Completed

Activity:

Development/Production

Lease:

P00188

Event(s):

Injury (1)

Area:

6A

Operation:

Production

Block:

5374

Cause:

Human Error

Rig/Platform:

/ Hondo

Water Depth:

842 feet

Remarks:  A contract employee was removing threaded studs on the flow safety valve (FSV) on a 4” flowline using a pneumatic saw to cut through the studs. In doing so, trapped pressure was released spraying oil/water emulsion on the worker’s chest and under his face shield and safety glasses resulting in bruising and blurred vision. The employee was not hospitalized but was not immediately released by his doctor to return to work.

The cause of the accident was the sudden release of trapped pressurized fluids between the FSV and a downstream header block valve when the flowline connection was partially opened. The system does not provide the means to bleed down trapped pressure downstream of the FSV. Additionally, the contract employee may not have followed proper procedure or safe work practice in electing to remove threaded studs by cutting rather than unscrewing, and the studs may have been damaged and in need of replacement.

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Last Updated: 10/19/09, 11:52 AM